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Introduction 
 
 In How the West Came to Rule (HWCR) we conclude with a call for ‘readers 
to address, research and fill out… the gaps made evident in this study… as there 
remains a great deal more to say’ (278). We are flattered and privileged that in this 
symposium our call1 has been taken up with such enthusiasm and sincerity by our 
colleagues Gurminder Bhambra, Ayse Zarakol, Eren Duzgun, Eric Mielants and 
David Blaney and Nayeem Inayatullah.2 In particular, we are grateful for the care 
and patience with which our arguments have been read, as well as the force of the 
criticisms posed. As with all good critical engagements, the pieces in this 
symposium are demanding. They have pushed us to clarify or refine our arguments 
and in some cases compelled us to revise them. Where we have disagreed with our 
critics, their criticisms have offered us the opportunity to develop responses and 
clarifications that we would have been unable to do otherwise. It is in this spirit of 
productive engagement set by our interlocutors that we reply.  
 
 We also acknowledge that what follows is by no means an ‘end’ to the 
dialogue. Our critics have provided food for thought beyond what we have been 
able to squeeze into a single reply piece. Our response therefore focuses on three 
themes that collectively frame our critics interventions. In the first section, we 
respond to Inayatullah’s and Blaney’s searching interrogation of what is logically 
constitutive of capitalism and what is historically constitutive of capitalism. They 
argue that we collapse the two meanings of constitutive; we respond by suggesting 
such a ‘collapsing’ may not be all that harmful.  
 
 The tensions Inayatullah and Blaney draw out between the ‘being’ of 
capitalism and its ‘becoming’ sets the stage for an exploration of the remaining 
themes of this symposium – our definition of capitalism and what is at stake in anti-
Eurocentric theorising and history-writing. In the second section, we respond to our 
critics’ objection with how we conceptualise, define or theorise capitalism. As we 
will see, Duzgun, Mielants, Zarakol and Bhambra all find problems in the way our 
definition of capitalism informs our historical analysis. In this section, we defend the 
‘more expansive’ conception of capitalism originally developed in HWCR and 
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demonstrate how such a definition avoids the sort of homogenisation of capitalism 
that might naturalise it.  
 
 In the third section, we examine our critics’ charge that HWCR does not 
successfully challenge Eurocentrism but in certain ways reproduces it. Here we 
insist that anti-Eurocentric analysis must fight (some of) its battles on the terrain of 
Europe itself, and defend the idea that anti-Eurocentric approaches can and should 
take Europe as their object of study and critique.  
 
 The Logic of History 
 
 Inayatullah and Blaney identify a potential tension that exists between our 
criticism of the internalist method in Eurocentrism and our criticism of Political 
Marxist definitions of capitalism. They show how our former line of criticism is 
historical and focuses on questioning the limited geographical scope of historical 
analysis. In contrast, the latter line is categorical and concerned with the definition 
or theorisation of capitalism’s specificity. Inayatullah and Blaney suggest that we do 
not sufficiently separate these two lines of investigation – we even conflate the two 
– and as a consequence we muddy the issue of what constitutes capitalism. 
 
 Inayatullah and Blaney find that we waver between two positions: between 
what is historically constitutive of capitalism and logically constitutive, between 
what is the geography and history of capitalism and what is categorical, between 
the becoming and being of capitalism.3 The issue is largely about necessity – what 
is necessary for capitalism to exist? For example, they write ‘we do not need a non-
Eurocentric story of capitalist development to raise the categorical issue about 
capitalist social relations and non-waged work, forced labour, patriarchy and racism: 
these are present in the narrow space of the West and can be accessed without 
much of a sense of capitalism’s history beyond the present’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 
2016: 42). 
 
 We would respond to this by noting that an apprehension of their presence 
is not all that is at stake.4 It might be argued for example that it is indeed possible 
to theorise racism from the perspective of Europe alone – Foucault (2003) famously 
did so. However, as others have highlighted, abstracting from the experiences of 
those in the Global South in the making of racism tends to generate a one-sided 
and impoverished conception of what racism is (Weheliye 2014). And as numerous 
critics of Western or white feminism have shown, particular conceptions of 
feminism masquerading as universal tend to generate new racialised and gendered 
hierarchies and practices of oppression (Mohanty 2003; Puar 2007).  
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 In both of these examples, the spatio-historical unevenness of these forms – 
racism, patriarchy – and their combination are absolutely central to what they are. 
Once we take this claim seriously it becomes difficult to talk categorically about any 
of these phenomena from an exclusively Western or European standpoint. Each of 
these examples also demonstrate Eurocentric modes of theorising make limited 
categorical claims precisely because of their limited empirical scope. Or put 
differently, the limit points – the inaccuracies and violences – of Eurocentric 
categorical claims become evident as soon as these categories leave the domain of 
their own empirical or historical referent. 
 
 Our claim about Eurocentrism is therefore not just a spatial one. It identifies 
disciplining practices which enable or delimit ways of thinking about categories 
(such as capitalism). For instance, the very spatial externalisation of unfree labour 
from Europe has been central to the myth that capitalism is categorically a system 
based on the exploitation of ‘free’ wage-labour. 
 
 Indeed, one of the interlocutors for Blaney and Inayatullah’s discussion and 
one of the biggest propagators of this myth – Ellen Meiksins Wood – apprehends 
racism and patriarchy in the presence of capitalism but denies their constitutive 
character – ‘for her, only class counts as constitutive – the other oppressions are 
important but correlative’ (Blaney and Inayatullah 2016: 49). In this respect, 
Wood’s version of what is constitutive ‘has less to do with history and more to do 
with logical necessity’. For Wood, capitalism can do without racism or sexism and is 
even indifferent to such identities; in contrast, capitalism cannot do without class – 
it is only class that is therefore logically and structurally necessary. 
  
 The issue we take with Wood is that this logical and structural necessity – 
the being of capitalism – is only conceivable through a formal abstraction of 
capitalism as a system based on market dependence and wage-labour. The very 
identification of being and what capitalism is involves the centring of this logical 
and structural necessity (class) by abstracting from practices that might call this 
centre into question. In a discussion of structuralism and structurationism, Roxanne 
Lynn Doty outlines the disciplining, marginalisation and violence involved in 
producing this centre: 
 
for any determination (of meaning or of what constitutes a structure) to take 
place, the play of differences must be limited and made systematically 
intelligible… all structures contain a center that organises and makes them 
coherent, and that both makes possible and limits the play of differences… all 
structures have a center (a generative logic, an organising principle) that both 
enables and limits practices. The goal of analyses for structuralists and 
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structurationists is to discover what this center, this generative logic is, and 
thereby what structures do by virtue of what they inherently are… The centre is 
effected through disciplining practice which marginalise all that would call into 
question its self-evident quality. Further the centre is always in the process of 
being effected. It is never finally fixed as pure presence… Because any system 
or structure of meaning exists at the expense of alternative possibilities, its 
construction involves practices that silence or marginalise those alternatives 
(Doty 1997: 378). 
 
 In HWCR we show how Eurocentrism – a specific claim about Europe as the 
geographical or spatial container of history – has been an especially pervasive 
‘disciplining practice’ in the theorising, centring and structuring the category of 
capitalism. Specifically, Eurocentrism has been the act or practice through which 
histories of unfree labour, enslavement, colonialism, racism and so on have been 
rendered marginal to the self-evident quality of capitalism (either as transhistorical 
and natural, or as a system formally and exhaustively defined by a particular form 
of exploitation – ‘free’ wage-labour). 
 
 The very possibility of a Eurocentric conception of capitalism is predicated on 
an a priori exclusion of the non-European and is logically constituted by – ‘is not 
conceivable without’ – this exclusion. In this respect, Eurocentrism is not just a 
spatial claim but a categorical one where the exclusion of non-European societies is 
itself constitutive of the categories generated by Eurocentric historical sociology. 
Seen in this light, we would push back against the claim that our account conflates 
the spatial and the categorical – it is more that the geopolitics of Eurocentrism acts 
as a disciplining practice that is generative of capitalism as a category. 
 
 So for us, what is really at stake is the denaturalisation of these categories 
through an interrogation of how they have come to be accessible or apprehended 
in our present: that is, the history behind them. With this shift in focus, the 
character of this ‘access’ or apprehension – either in terms of positionality, 
geographical scope or empirical focus – becomes absolutely crucial. To lean on an 
oft-cited line by Friedrich Nietszche: ‘There is no “being” behind doing, effecting, 
becoming; the doer is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything’ 
(Nietzsche 1969: 45; see also Butler 1990: 25). Our response to Blaney and 
Inayatullah’s searching interrogation is therefore simple but hopefully not banal: 
there is no being of capitalism independent of its becoming. There is no logic to 
capitalism independent of its history. There are no categories of capitalism that 
operate independent of a spatio-historical setting (or the interconnections between 
these settings).5  
 
 That Political Marxists such as Ellen Wood would seek to construct such a 
strict division between what is categorically and historically constitutive of 
73 
 
Why Europe? Anti-Eurocentric Theory, History, and the Rise of Capitalism 
capitalism, between capitalism’s abstract logic of being and historical process of 
becoming, is on the surface of things quite paradoxical given Wood and other 
Political Marxists celebration of E.P. Thompson’s influence on their work. 6  
Thompson’s critique of Althusserian structuralism has been a key point of reference 
for Wood (2002), and she makes much use of Thompson’s notion of capitalism 
holding a distinctive ‘logic of process’. Yet Thompson’s concept of a ‘logic of process’ 
was formulated precisely to overcome the dualisms between theory and history, 
logic and process, and being and becoming he detected in Althusser’s overly 
structuralist, ahistorical rendition of historical materialism. The problem of 
Althusser’s structuralism, as Thompson explains (1978: 113), was the necessary 
denial of any conception of  
 
history as process, as open-ended and indeterminate eventuation – but not for 
that reason devoid of rational logic or of determining pressures – in which 
categories are defined in particular contexts but are continuously ‘undergoing 
historical redefinition, and whose structure is not pre-given but protean, 
continually changing in form and in articulation …  
 
 By contrast, for Thompson the starting point for any proper theoretical 
conception of capitalism was not to envision it in terms of some ideal-type structure 
– to abstract logic from history – but as one of ‘structured process’ (1978: 137). 
Thus, in order to overcome the ‘freezing’ of history entailed in Althusser’s ‘closed 
system’ of theoretical knowledge holding only the most tenuous relation to the ‘real 
history’ of capitalism, Thompson introduces the idea of a ‘logic of process’ particular 
to capitalism. For any social system’s ‘logic of process can only be described in 
terms of historical analysis’ and ‘“history” may only be theorised in terms of its own 
properties’ (Thompson 1978: 114). Through this move, the connections between 
history and theory as both processes in and of themselves may be brought into a 
more productive and co-constitutive relationship; a means to reflect upon the 
spatio-historical character and context of theory, and interrogate the theoretical 
presuppositions of producing historical knowledge itself. This too requires we 
dispense with any hypostatisation or privileging of our abstract theoretical 
conceptions of capitalism’s being over its historical process of becoming, for  
 
Those propositions of historical materialism which bear upon the relation 
between social being and social consciousness, upon the relations of production 
and their determinations, upon modes of exploitation, class struggle, ideology, 
or upon capitalist social and economic formations, are (at one pole of their 
'dialogue') derived from the observation of historical eventuation over time. This 
observation is not of discrete facts seriatim but of sets of facts with their own 
regularities: of the repetition of certain kinds of event: of the congruence of 
certain kinds of behaviour within differing contexts: in short, of the evidences of 
systematic social formations and of a common logic of process. Such historical 
theories as arise (not of themselves, but, at the other pole of the dialogue, by 
arduous conceptualisation) cannot be tested, as is often supposed, by calling a 
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halt to process, 'freezing' history, and taking a static geological section, which 
will show capitalism or class hierarchies at any given moment of time as an 
elaborated structure. In investigating history we are not flicking through a series 
of 'stills', each of which shows us a moment of social time transfixed into a 
single eternal pose: for each one of these 'stills' is not only a moment of being 
but also a moment of becoming [emphasis added]: and even within each 
seemingly-static section there will be found contradictions and liaisons, 
dominant and subordinate elements, declining or ascending energies 
(Thompson 1978: 63-64). 
 
 Once removed from the method of ‘freezing’ or abstracting from history as 
the path to proper theory the question then becomes what histories do we look at?  
 
 We would suggest that in emphasising the becoming of capitalism we can 
see how its being – its centre – is constantly disturbed from beyond its own 
margins. Hence, one of the main arguments in HWCR is that this disturbance has 
(a) historically come from and (b) is most evident in non-European societies, the 
‘margins’ of Europe at the limit point of Europe, beyond the border of Europe 
(categorically and geographically). It is here that we can see the way in which 
unfree labour and related forms of social control rooted in racism, patriarchy and 
colonial coercion impinge upon and actively (re)create the conditions of possibility 
for ‘free’ wage-labour. In this regard, these forms are constitutive in a logical sense 
– capitalism cannot dispense with them.7  
 
 We show this in HWCR with our discussion of the simple and expanded 
reproduction of capital. We suggest that an exclusive focus on the ‘being’ of 
capitalism leads us to a narrow historicisation of the ‘simple reproduction of capital’: 
that is, ‘market dependence’ and the continual need for workers to sell their labour-
power in exchange for a wage. This is the story of the English countryside, the 
enclosures and agrarian capitalism. But for Marx, capital was also logically 
constituted by the ‘expanded reproduction of capital’. This pointed to a vast sphere 
of activity that enables and sustains such market dependence, in particular when 
‘simple reproduction’ reaches its limits. Specifically, we argue that the expanded 
reproduction of capital identifies processes that account for the absorption of 
surpluses created by capital accumulation, either in the form of capital investments 
or surplus populations shed from production by technological developments. To be 
clear, our claim is not that simple reproduction and expanded reproduction are 
distinct historical stages that follow one another. But, rather, that both are 
constitutive components in the functioning of capitalism itself.  
 
 A historical investigation of what expanded reproduction is in practice 
demonstrates this broader field of practices and social relations that are irreducible 
to ‘free’ wage-labour but fundamental to its making. For example, England’s 
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capitalism was dependent on the widened sphere of activity offered by the Atlantic; 
it was only through the sociological combination of American land, African slave 
labour and English capital that the limits of English agrarian capitalism were 
eventually surmounted. Similarly, proto-capitalist enterprises in the Low Countries 
were stifled by the relatively low supply of labour at home which was only 
overcome by tapping into a vast well of labour in Southeast Asia. There, the 
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC: Dutch East India Company) created a 
commercial network that combined uneven labour processes spanning the spice-
producing islands in Indonesia, precious metal production in Japan and China, and 
textile workers in India into a single integrated network of ‘global’ production. It 
was through these intersocietal interactions that the VOC were able to integrate a 
disparate yet large mass of labour-power into their own operations. The 
development and ultimate survival of the institutional innovations central to the 
development of capitalism in Holland – the Bourse, the Amsterdam entrepôt and 
the VOC – were thus all founded on this subjugated and exploited mass of unfree 
Asian labour-power. Had it not been for the expanded reproduction of Dutch and 
English capitalism through colonial expansion, force and war, their capitalist 
development would have been unsustainable in ways other ‘antediluvian’ forms of 
capital were. 
 
Defining Capitalism 
 
 It is also for this reason that we would push back against Bhambra's claim 
that non-European societies do not change the way we think about capitalism. As 
we repeatedly emphasise, this spatial decentring of capitalism also necessitates a 
categorical decentring of the capital relation. As discussed elsewhere (Anievas and 
Nisanciouglu 2016a), one of the primary concerns of HWCR was to demonstrate 
how a geographically decentred history of the origins of capitalism also decentres 
the singular emphasis or priority given to the capital-labour relation in other Marxist 
approaches (for example, Political Marxism).  
 
 That being said, in no way did we want to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater; an understanding of how the capital-labour relation operates is of 
course ‘central’ (in the sense of being important) to understanding the operation of 
the capitalist mode of production. But to properly understand the operation of the 
capital-labour relation we need to look beyond the immediate form of exploitation 
and beyond those social relations reducible to it. To say that racism, patriarchy and 
state violence are crucial to the operation of the capital-labour relation (but not 
reducible to it) at once decentres that relation but also provides a fuller explication 
of its operation.8 The upshot of such an approach is to necessarily examine how 
various, seemingly disparate, social processes structurally relate to one another in 
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the making and reproduction of capitalism; it is to move beyond any approach that 
aims to establish or privilege one social relation as the sole historical or political 
prime mover. In these ways, we sought to identify ways in which theories of 
capitalism can be disturbed by and opened up to questions, experiences, social 
relations and processes situated outside the confines of Europe. We do however 
acknowledge that the alternative theorisation we offer in the book is far from 
complete and insist that we stand at the beginning rather than the end of such a 
project. 
 
 It is important therefore to note that the definition of capitalism provided in 
the book was not, as Bhambra suggests, the original definition we took as ‘our 
starting point’ of analysis. Rather, a central ‘finding’ of HWCR was that the working 
definition of capitalism we had at the outset of writing the book proved problematic 
in capturing the multiplicity of variegated processes and relations that we came to 
see as integral to the emergence of capitalism. Fortunately, the readers do not 
have to take our word for this, as our original definition of capitalism can be found 
in the article that set us on the path to writing HWCR. In that article, we defined 
capitalism as ‘a distinctive mode of production characterised by the systemisation of 
competitive accumulation primarily based on the exploitation of wage-labour’ 
(Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2013: 82fn24). Such a definition, we felt, had the benefit 
of stressing both the vertical (capital-labour) and horizontal (inter-capitalist) 
dimension of the capitalist mode of production, rather than privileging one relation 
over the other.  
 
 Yet as our research progressed we realised that while such a definition was 
not necessarily incorrect, it was nonetheless incomplete. Quite simply, the history 
we were confronting and grappling with was pointing towards a more complex 
understanding of both how capitalism came into being, and what were in turn the 
continuing conditions for its reproduction. It was in particular the engagement with 
the intersocietal dimensions of capitalism’s emergence and reproduction – a history 
that we argue is unintelligible without a proper reckoning with the ‘connected 
histories’ (to use Bhambra’s preferred analytic) between Europe and the non-West 
– that, in the end, led us to fundamentally revise our conception (and thus theory) 
of capitalism  
 
 We therefore came to redefine capitalism as encompassing more than the 
kind of ideal-type conceptions of capitalism as constituted by the capital and wage-
labour relation that figures so prominently in many traditional Marxist accounts. 
Instead, we argue that capitalism is best understood as entailing a wider set of 
configurations or assemblages of social relations and processes that are 
systematically geared toward the reproduction of the capital-labour relation, but not 
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reducible – either historically or logically – to that relation alone (HWCR: 9). As 
should be apparent, this redefinition of capitalism entails precisely the kinds of 
‘unequal power hierarchies’ incorporating racialised, gendered and sexual forms of 
oppression and control that Mielants calls for.9 
 
 Much then hangs on exactly how one defines capitalism, and this is a key 
line of division and critique among our interlocutors. If Bhambra criticises us for 
holding a Eurocentric conception of capitalism, Duzgun takes us to task for 
providing a ‘transhistorical’ conception of capitalism that renders ‘every past event 
into a necessary “precondition” for the rise of capitalism’ (Duzgun 2016: 11). Here 
we find the typical Political Marxist critique of the neo-Smithian model of economic 
development – that we assume what in fact needs to be explained: a distinctive 
‘market rationality’, what Wood understands as the circumstances and conditions 
by which producers become subjected to ‘market imperatives’ (Wood 2002: 50; see 
Duzgun 2016: 12).  
 
 The problem here is that this critique is only applicable if we subscribed to 
the commercialisation model which views the expansion and intensification of trade, 
markets and exchange relations as the fundamental drivers of capitalist 
development. Yet we do not hold such a view, and Duzgun seems to have 
fundamentally misunderstood our explanatory logic of how capitalism develops, 
imputing to us a ‘transhistorical motive to improve productive forces’ which we 
assume but do not explain. For only ‘when one assumes a necessary connection 
between commercial, demographic, technological factors on the one hand, and 
capitalism on the other, can international factors be deemed “determinant” of and 
“preconditions” for the transition to capitalism’ (Duzgun 2016: 11).  
 
 Yet Duzgun’s continual reference to our view of a ‘transhistorical compulsion 
to improve productive forces’ seems to conflate two distinct claims: (1) that agents 
in pre-capitalist societies can and have developed the productive forces10 in ways 
increasing the overall social productivity of labour, and; (2) that one can posit a 
transhistorical imperative to develop the productive forces and agents will do so 
irrespective of time and space. Duzgun’s argument rests on the claim that our 
theory assumes the latter, but nowhere does he substantiate this assertion with 
any textual evidence. This is because do we do not make this claim nor does the 
theory of uneven and combined development presume such a transhistorical logic 
of developing the productive forces. The only claim we make in the book on the 
status of the productive forces in history (and by extension theory) regards point 1 
that agents can and have developed the productive forces prior to capitalism and, 
secondly, that societies can and have absorbed more advanced productive forces 
through intersocietal exchanges. If Duzgun would like to dispute these historical 
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claims and demonstrate their potential problems for theory, then we invite him to 
do so. But to impute that we are making a transhistorical argument is inaccurate. 
 
 Fitting our analysis into this imagined ‘transhistorical’ framework, Duzgun 
makes much of our use of the term ‘preconditions’ in our analysis of the effects of 
the Pax Mongolica on the breakdown of serfdom in Western Europe during the 
Long 13th Century. There we argued that the Mongol Empire’s establishment of 
favourable geopolitical conditions for the ‘extensive development of market 
relations, trade, urban growth, and perhaps most importantly an increasingly 
complex division of labour in Western Europe’ were ‘preconditions’ for a later 
capitalist development (HWCR: 75, quoted by Duzgun 2016: 11). Yet nowhere do 
we claim that these factors in and of themselves – i.e. considered in isolation from 
the other institutional and social processes of transformation we examine – could or 
would have led to capitalism nor that these factors taken in isolation have any 
necessary relation to the development of capitalism (see also Anievas and 
Nişancıoğlu 2016b). Indeed, we explicitly and repeatedly warn against taking a 
theoretical approach that would assume any such necessary connection. For 
example, we approvingly reiterate Robert Brenner’s original critique of Wallerstein’s 
‘commercialisation model’ writing that ‘[w]hile the intensification of urban growth, 
trade and markets throughout Europe in the early modern era could act as 
“preconditions” for the eventual development of capitalism, such developments, 
taken on their own, were incapable of engendering the transition to capitalism, as 
cities and markets were not by “nature or even tendentially capitalist” (HWCR: 21) 
 
 Does then the use of the notion of ‘preconditions’ necessarily imply 
teleologically projecting back in time a historically specific capitalist ‘logic of action’ 
assuming precisely what needs to be explained? Hardly not. For in the very 
footnote accompanying the above passage on the effects of the Mongol Empire 
that Duzgun points to as ‘evidence’ of what he terms (following Karl Polanyi) the 
‘economistic fallacy’, we point out that even the strongest critics of the 
‘commercialisation model’ agree that the ‘cities, trade and markets which had 
evolved throughout Europe were a pre-condition for the development of English 
capitalism’ as Wood herself does in describing Brenner’s analysis of the origins of 
capitalism. Yet, as we go on, the point is that ‘these developments in themselves 
could not act in engendering the emergence of capitalism’ (HWCR: 307fn92, 
emphasis added).  
 
 In fact, if anyone can be accused of falling into the ‘economistic fallacy’ trap 
it is Duzgun who appears to conflate Polanyi’s conception of ‘institutionalised 
markets’ with capitalism as such. As Duzgun puts it (2016: 12), 
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no matter how widespread the transhistorical indicators of capitalism were, all 
transitions to capitalism presuppose the establishment of what Polanyi calls 
‘institutionalized markets’ to compel and induce economic action driven by a 
distinctive market rationality. Put differently, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu fail to 
recognize that what is critical to the transition to capitalism is not the 
existence of wage labor, private property or dispossession per se (suggesting 
otherwise would simply collapse capitalism’s consequences into its causes), 
but the generalization of a form of social relationship that is subsumed to the 
operation of the ‘law of value’. 
 
There are two points of particular relevance here. Firstly, ‘institutionalised 
markets’11 – meaning ‘self-regulating markets…governed by seemingly impersonal 
signals of demand and supply’ in which ‘“land and food were mobilized and labor 
was turned into a commodity free to be purchased in the market”’ (Duzgun 2016: 9 
in part quoting Polanyi) – are not enough to account for the presence of capitalism. 
Institutionalised commodity, land and labour markets existed throughout much of 
Europe from around the beginning of the 10th century. And, as recent research 
shows, price movements in these markets did reflect ‘demand and supply 
conditions fairly quickly’ (Persson 2014: 227). Hence, Duzgun essentially 
reproduces Polanyi’s ‘primitivist’ conception of pre-modern societies which 
dramatically underestimates the role markets played in organising such societies 
(see e.g. Meikle 2010; Bresson 2015; Dale 2016).  
 
 The underlying problem here perhaps lies with the fact that Polanyi never 
provided a fully worked-out theory of capitalism as such (Dale 2016), but rather 
spoke in terms of ‘market society’ that he viewed as only having emerged in 19th 
century Europe (Polanyi 1957). Conflating capitalism with ‘market society’ thereby 
risks falling into the kinds of idealised conceptions of capitalism associated with 
neo-classical economics. Indeed, Polanyi himself was somewhat ambiguous on the 
matter writing, for example, that the ‘self-regulating market’ was an ‘inherent 
impossibility – it is a utopia’, the market economy being ‘more of an ideology than 
an actual fact’ as ‘the separation of economics and politics was never carried 
completely into effect’ (Polanyi as quoted in Dale 2016).12  
 
 That Duzgun would hold up early modern France as the exemplar of a non-
capitalist society based on Polanyi’s notion of institutionalised markets also appears 
rather strange given the vibrant and extensive market relations in pre-revolutionary 
France which can be certainly characterised as operating according to an 
‘institutionalized supply-demand price mechanism’ (Polanyi 1957: 34; see e.g. 
Hoffmann 1996; Heller 2009; Sewell 2010; Horn 2015). Either way, rather than re-
debate whether or not early modern France was capitalist,13 Duzgun’s key claim 
(2016: 13) is that our ‘uncritical assimilation of absolutist France into “capitalism”’ 
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ends up ‘obscuring the multilinearity of historical development within Europe itself’. 
Yet why would conceptualising early modern France as capitalist logically result in 
such an obfuscation of the overall multilinearity of European development? We may 
pose this question given the extent to which we examine the multilinear 
developmental trajectories of various European states over the early modern period, 
particularly focusing on the divergence between the declining feudal Iberian 
Empires and rising Dutch and English capitalist states. In other words, an empirical 
disagreement has to whether France was capitalist does not logically entail a 
unilinear conception of ‘European development’. Moreover, as we argue in the book, 
the history of capitalism is a multiple, polyvalent one, irreducible to any single form, 
type or process of transition. In this respect, it makes more sense to talk of 
capitalisms rather than capitalism thereby introducing a certain degree of 
multilinearity within the history of capitalism itself (HWCR: 9).  
 
 Secondly, the operation of the ‘law of value’, according to Marx, does not 
simply rest on the existence of institutionalised, self-regulating markets, but takes 
as its necessary presupposition wage-labour. Where else would ‘surplus value’ 
came from? The derivation of surplus value from the operation of the market – 
institutionalised or otherwise – would seem to reproduce the fetishism of bourgeois 
political economy that Marx is at pains to criticise. This is precisely why the ‘market’ 
or even ‘property’ were not the central explanatory categories of Marx’s thought, 
and capitalism was not defined in market terms (Davidson 2012).14  
 
 Marx is quite clear on this point, claiming for example that capitalist 
production is distinguished by two ‘characteristic traits’. The first is that commodity 
production is the ‘dominant’ and ‘determining’ character of production which implies, 
first and foremost, that ‘labour generally appears as wage-labour’ (Marx 1981: 
1019). The second distinguishing feature of the ‘capitalist mode of production is the 
production of surplus-value as the direct object and determining motive of 
production’. And this too necessarily implies the existence of wage-labour for 
 
It is only because labour is presupposed in the form of wage-labour, and the 
means of production in the form of capital (i.e. only as a result of the specific 
form of these two essential agents of production), that one part of the value 
(product) presents itself as surplus-value and this surplus-value presents itself 
as profit (rent), the gains of the capitalist, as additional available wealth 
belonging to him (Marx 1981:1021). 
 
 This same point is made when Marx discusses the necessity of tracing the 
violent process of primitive accumulation out of which capital and labour came 
together and confronted each other as a social relation: 
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We have seen how money is changed into capital; how surplus-value is made 
through capital, and how more capital is made through surplus-value. But the 
accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes 
capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of 
considerable masses of capital and of labour-power in the hands of 
commodity-producers. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around 
in a never-ending circle, which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive 
accumulation (the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith) which precedes 
capitalist accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode 
of production but its point of departure (Marx 1976: 873). 
 
 Wage-labour is then a necessary presupposition for the existence of 
capitalism, not its consequence. 15  Arguing otherwise would be to reject Marx’s 
social theory of value and deny the operation of the law of value, which is exactly 
what Duzgun is basing his argument upon.  
 
 At the same time, to reiterate the above argument regarding capitalism’s 
‘preconditions’, we would argue that the existence of wage-labour is also not in 
itself enough to gauge the existence of capitalism understood as a full-fledged 
mode of production. The simple reason being that one can point to numerous 
instances of the extensive use of wage-labour in many parts of the world prior to 
capitalism (see e.g. Shatzmiller 1997; Banaji 2010; Hofmeester 2012; Persson 
2014). For this reason, we argue in HWCR that one needs to make a distinction 
between capital and capitalism, and that it is only the latter which entails the 
wholesale transformation and reordering of social relations in the service of the 
competitive accumulation and reproduction of capital.16 In these ways, we would 
argue that our conception of capitalism is much more historicist than those that 
reduce capitalism to the immediate form of exploitation or ‘institutionalised markets’ 
as both these phenomena anteceded the emergence of capitalism.  
 
 Of course, there is another tradition of thought that provides a more 
expansive definition of capitalism: World Systems Analysis (WSA).17 This is the body 
of thought that Eric Mielants forcefully defends in his critical interrogation of our 
work. We cannot do justice to all the points raised by Mielants (but see more below) 
so let us for the moment focus again on the question of defining capitalism which is 
both implicitly and explicitly central to his critique. Mielants takes issue with our 
critique of Wallerstein’s account of the transition to capitalism and his conception of 
it, claiming at various points that we have essentially misunderstood, missed or 
ignored Wallerstein’s – and other WSA scholars’ – work.18 Yet in his defense of 
Wallerstein, Mielants’ demonstrates some of the very problems we identified.  
 
 Mielants claims, for example, that WSA scholars conceptualise wage-labour 
and coerced labour as ‘intrinsically linked’ and that the ‘substantial amounts of 
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wage labor [that] exists in the core zones of capital accumulation’ do so ‘precisely 
because of capital’s relation with non-wage labor practices in the periphery’ 
(Mielants 2016: 32). So far, so good. As Mielants points out in a footnote, we too 
‘admit as much’ regarding this necessary relationship between wage-labour in the 
core and coerced labour in the periphery thereby bringing us ‘quite close to the 
explanatory theoretical framework in WSA’ (Mielants 2016: 37fn5). 
 
 Mielants is quite perplexed that we would make such similar claims to WSA 
and even occasionally use some of its terminology, such as the notion of a ‘world 
system’, given our ‘denunciation of WSA’. But here is the key difference between 
ourselves and WSA that goes to crux of the issue: unlike WSA we do not 
conceptualise the capitalist ‘world-system’ as a homogenous whole. We do not, in 
other words, share Wallerstein’s conception of society in the ontologically singular – 
that once capitalism emerges, it is a world system of a singular type of society 
(capitalism) which thereby flattens, overlooks and/or annihilates the substantive 
sociological differences of the various societies making up the world system. 
Mielants demonstrates the problems of this approach when he writes: 
 
Just as Portugal was a 17th century semi peripheral power which embraced the 
notion of a mare clausum (p. 233), the Soviet Union in the middle of the 20th 
century was also in favor of a highly protectionist strategy with more overt 
governmental intervention. Both were, however, operating within the logic and 
constraints of the capitalist modern world system (Mielants 2016: 31). 
 
 This conception of the relationship between capitalism – which, of course, 
operates globally – and individual states or societies is predicated upon what we 
believe is a fundamentally problematic assumption: that the mere incorporation of 
a society into the capitalist world system automatically renders it capitalism. Or, as 
Mielants further notes (2016: 37fn4) in regards to the Soviet Union, ‘WSA insisted 
the “communist” polity was not located outside the capitalist world economy but 
was an integral part of it, albeit very protectionist’. We might agree that the Soviet 
state was an ‘integral part’ of the capitalist world economy, but would nonetheless 
argue that this factor by itself would not make it capitalist.19 It is in this respect that 
WSA continues to privilege the ‘sphere of circulation’ over production even if, as 
Mielants correctly points out, Wallerstein and other WSA scholars have certainly 
paid attention to developments within the productive sphere in Europe.  
 
 Similar points have of course been made some time ago by Ernesto Laclau 
when criticising Andre Gunder Frank’s dependency theory for having ‘constantly 
confused the two concepts of the capitalist mode of production and participation in 
a world capitalist economic system’ (Laclau 1971: 37-38, emphasis original). This is 
hardly a ‘question of semantics’ as Wallerstein once dismissed it (1974: 392). For 
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Wallerstein’s attempt to overcome the problem of ‘methodological nationalism’ by 
scaling up concepts typically used to understand their internal attributes and 
dynamics (‘capitalism’, ‘division of labour’, ‘core/periphery’, etc.) simply reproduces 
the problem of the ‘domestic analogy’ on an even larger scale, eliminating what is a 
constitutive feature of any intersocietal system: interactively-generated difference 
and hybridity, the interconnected and multilinear character of all development. And, 
as we show in HWCR, the interaction and combination of these different types of 
social structures is in fact what explains the origins of capitalism and the ‘capitalist 
world system’ as such. Thus, while Wallerstein is correct to identify the existence of 
a world system as the overarching structural context in which all societies must 
operate, this system must be conceptualised as a ‘complex whole, containing 
multiple modes of production’ (Foster-Carter 1978: 74; see Laclau 1971: 38).  
 
 By subsuming societal differences to a singularly-conceived ‘capitalist world-
system’ Wallerstein’s WSA thereby fails to overcome the problem of Eurocentrism: 
all the world is taken to be the functionally differentiated expressions of a singular 
type of social structure that Wallerstein identifies as having emerged within Europe 
through uniquely intra-European dynamics. European development is thus 
conceived as one of self-generation and is in turn taken to be the ‘prime mover’ or 
‘core’ of history transmitting its social form throughout the world in a unidirectional 
West-to-East fashion thereby rendering ‘non-Western’ agency mute in the 
process.20 This then brings us back to the question of Eurocentrism.  
 
 Europe as an Object of Study 
 
 So far we have primarily focused on how we define capitalism and its 
consequences for how we read history. However, a second theme or line of 
criticism is that the anti-Eurocentric approach we propose fails deliver on its 
promise – if anything it reproduces Eurocentrism. There are three separate lines of 
criticism here. Firstly, that a truly non-Eurocentric history would have looked at the 
impact of European societies on non-European ones or the development of 
capitalism outside of Europe. Secondly, that in not taking non-European countries 
in themselves (i.e. independently from the study of Europe) we are committing a 
Eurocentrism of our own kind – studying these societies as subordinated to or 
instrumentalised in the name of studying Europe. Thirdly, that by including non-
European societies in our history of capitalism we are approving or supportive of 
capitalism in some way.  
 
 Let us start with the first criticism. Both Zarakol and Bhambra point to the 
absence of any discussion of the origins of capitalism outside of Europe which could 
problematise our focus on Europe. For example, Bhambra taxes us for working with 
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a methodological assumption ‘that rests on the believed “undeniability” of particular 
“facts” – namely, that Europe is the origin of particular processes, even if events 
and peoples in other places provided the conditions for those developments – such 
that even if it is accepted that “‘Eurocentrism” is inappropriate as a methodological 
assumption, the fact of European capitalism cannot be denied’ (Bhambra 2016: 1). 
Similarly, Zarakol points to various scholars (particularly Randall Collins) who have 
identified capitalist arrangements in medieval Buddhist China and especially pre-
Tokugawa Japan thus demonstrating their ability to have ‘independently developed 
capitalism before their interactions with European powers’ (Zarakol 2016: 19). 
While Zarakol remains sceptical as to whether these pre-modern societies can 
indeed be considered capitalist, she nonetheless poses a very interesting question 
regarding the hypothetical case of a capitalist pre-Tokugawa Japan: 
 
if it could indeed be shown that capitalism developed independently in island 
societies facing similar resource and demographic challenges, societies which, for 
varying reasons, were similarly insulated from the developments in their 
neighbouring continents, would this not make the emergence of capitalism (if not 
the expansion of it) one of the rare social phenomena that is more suited to 
endogenous explanations? (Zarakol 2016: 21). 
 
 There are few relevant issues to be raised in properly addressing this 
question. Firstly, and further relating to Bhambra’s point, is that studies such as 
those by Collins (1997) that analyse the emergence of various forms of capitalism 
in pre-modern Asian history – or pre-modern European history, for that matter – 
typically work with conceptions of capitalism that fall into the ‘economistic fallacy’ 
highlighted by Duzgun. In other words, they either hold to some variation of the 
‘commercialisation model’ of development or (neo-)Weberian conceptions that 
conflate capitalism with the existence of extensive exchange relations, commodity 
markets, and private property. They have also tended to equate capitalism with the 
mere presence of capitalists, while blurring the distinction between simple 
merchants and industrial capitalists.  
 
 The upshot of all this is a precarious engagement with the emergence of 
capitalism as a social totality. Here again we would re-iterate the decisive 
importance of distinguishing between ‘antediluvian’ forms of capital that have 
existed periodically, if sporadically, throughout much of history and capitalism 
understood as a historical mode of production. Only the latter entails the wholesale 
transformation and re-ordering of social relations and processes geared toward the 
systemic reproduction of the capital-wage-labour relation in ways that makes 
possible the competitive accumulation and expanded reproduction of capital. This is 
what makes capitalism historically distinct, what constitutes its ‘logic of process’, 
and what thereby allows us to properly adjudicate its existence. This definition has 
the advantage of retaining a radically historicist understanding of capitalism while 
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avoiding the Eurocentric trap of deriving an ideal-type conception of capitalism 
based on a privileging of European history given that it is precisely the interactions 
between ‘West’ and ‘East’ that are central to our conceptualisation and theory of it.  
 
 Secondly, Zarakol’s argument about capitalism developing ‘independently’ 
(i.e. endogenously) within pre-Tokugawa Japan rests on a particular assumption 
about the character of pre-modern Japanese development: that it was relatively 
isolated or immune from outside influences and pressures. Zarakol writes (2016: 21) 
that ‘if there is one place in the world that resembles England in its suitability for 
methodologically internalist analyses, that must be Japan’. The problem here, 
however, is that this assumption regarding the ‘insulated’ character of Japanese 
development, like the English case, does not hold.  
 
 While it certainly true that the geographical position of the Japanese 
archipelago placed it at the edge of the ‘China-centred tributary trade system’ 
(Arrighi 2007: 314) thereby somewhat insulating Japan from an intensive 
incorporation into that system (Hall 1970: 7), the course of pre-modern Japanese 
development was nonetheless fundamentally embedded within and impacted by its 
wider intersocietal context (see Allinson and Anievas 2010b). Unlike Korea, whose 
common border with China exerted a constant force, Japan was once removed by 
sea making it ‘almost safe from Chinese or nomadic invasions’ (Lee 2006: 14). At 
the same time, situated on the geographic frontier of this Sino-centred order, the 
Japanese developed a ‘high level of cultural life in touch with, but not overwhelmed 
by, continental influence’ (Hall 1970: 7). Indeed, a persistent feature of Japanese 
development has been the persistent ability to selectively borrow and innovate 
upon the intellectual and material conquests of the more ‘advanced’ Chinese 
civilisation. These ‘cultural’ capabilities of the Japanese were, as Kees van der Pijl 
argues, characteristic of other imperial frontier societies which were historically 
distinguished as ‘zone[s] of experimentation and innovation’ operating at the 
interstices of different imperial centres (Van der Pijl 2007: 76-7, 102-3). From the 
Chinese, the Japanese adopted philosophical and religious systems (Confucianism 
and Buddhism), the roots of their written language, administrative and 
governmental technics, agricultural technologies, styles of art and architecture, 
among many other socio-cultural traits (Totmann 2004: 31-44). 
 These cross-cultural flows of ideas, technologies and organisational forms 
wrought far-reaching transformations in the centuries-long process of early ‘state’ 
formation in Japan. As in Korea, for example, the adoption of more advanced 
agricultural techniques from China substantially increased total food supplies 
thereby permitting increased population growth and social stratification as 
witnessed much earlier in China (Totman 2004: 40, 44). The pre-modern Japanese 
social formation can therefore be seen as part of a wider pattern of combined 
86 
 
Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu 
 
intersocietal development constituted by the Sino-centred East Asian ‘world system’, 
cultural order and material division of labour formed no later than the 13th century 
(Abu-Lughod 1989). This in turn resulted in novel amalgams of socio-political 
orders and cultural institutions within Japan itself.   
 
 In these ways, pre-Tokugawa Japanese development was certainly 
combined in the sense of being interdependent with the broader ‘structures of 
social, material and cultural life’ (Rosenberg 2006: 324) making up the 13th century 
intersocietal system. Our point here regarding these intersocietal dimensions of 
pre-modern Japanese development echoes one made by Trotsky about the impact 
of ‘external’ influences on Russian history: ‘It is difficult to say what shape Russian 
social development would have taken if it had remained isolated and under the 
influence of inner tendencies only. It is enough to say that this did not happen’ 
(Trotsky 1962, 170).  
 
 Another line of criticism of our non-Eurocentric approach presented by 
Zarakol and Mielants is that a truly non-Eurocentric approach would have studied 
Europe’s impact on non-European societies – both point to the Ottoman Empire in 
particular. Specifically, Mielants suggests that our treatment of the non-West 
‘reveals too little about it’ to count as non-Eurocentric knowledge. We would, firstly, 
draw attention to the various instances in HWCR where we do talk about non-
European societies as well as the impact of relations with Europe on them: in our 
discussion of relations between Europeans and indigenous communities of the 
Americas; between Europeans and West African kingdoms; between Europeans and 
South East Asian communities such as the Banda Islands; and between Europeans 
and the Mughal Empire. For what it’s worth, our prior work has also looked at the 
impact of Europe on the Ottoman Empire and Tokugawa Japan (Nişancıoğlu 2013; 
Allinson and Anievas 2010b).  
 
 With that said, we would also insist that our object of study (or rather object 
of critique) remains Europe. Our aim was less to produce knowledge about the 
‘non-West’ in and of itself than to produce knowledge about Europe through the 
incorporation of hitherto marginalised histories outside of Europe’s geographical 
confines. Here it is important to remember that many histories which have traced 
the impact of Europe on ‘the Rest’ have themselves been central to the making of 
Eurocentrism. These histories have often provided a diffusionist model of change 
that places European societies at the core and non-European societies at the 
periphery. In such models, the former is presented as the driver of history and the 
latter as passive recipients of European effects.21 
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  In HWCR, we wanted to reverse this relation and this method of history-
writing. Rather than offering a discussion of the impact of Europeans elsewhere, we 
showed how non-European societies were makers of history, and were makers of 
history on the terrain of Europe itself. This, we believe, not only challenges the 
view of non-European societies as passive actors but also shows that the internalist 
model of Eurocentric history-writing – which presents European history as hermetic 
and endogenous – is flawed. In this respect, our aim was to write – as we have 
said elsewhere – ‘a non-Eurocentric history of Europe’ (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 
2016c). 
 
 This brings us to the second criticism – that by placing an emphasis on 
Europe we are succumbing to Eurocentrism. In this view a truly non-Eurocentric 
history would not talk about Europe but rather provincialise it and avoid ‘subsuming’ 
it under a European narrative (note already the tension between the first and 
second line of criticism). But we are more precise in what we mean by 
Eurocentrism. In HWCR we define it as methodological internalism, historical 
priority and linear developmentalism (4-5). This definition points to a specific set of 
relations of power constructed through a relationship between European and non-
European societies, and forms of knowledge that are grounded in often 
mythologised histories of Europe (as self-generating, self-propelling and 
diffusionist). It is specifically this epistemological and methodological framework 
that we confront and dismantle in HWCR.  
 
 Moreover, we show that capitalism emerged historically, in practice, through 
acts of subordination, oppression and exploitation that were conducted by 
Europeans at the expense of non-Europeans – practices that were themselves 
constitutive of Eurocentrism. Therefore, to talk effectively about Eurocentrism and 
tackle it, we consider it necessary to at once shed light on this history and the 
myths and knowledge produced by, in, and through this history. Insofar as 
supplanting Eurocentrism involves dismantling the myths constructed of Europe 
itself, turning away from Europe can only partially achieve this as we suggest in our 
discussion of Subaltern Studies (HWCR: 32-42).  
 
 Mielants (2016: 34) in particular questions why ‘capitalism and/or the 
Industrial Revolution in England remains the primary focus of what actually needs 
to be explained (albeit by exogenous forces)’. 22  Our response is resounding 
agreement. We consider the industrial revolution historically significant in the 
making of capitalism. We also consider it significant in the making of European 
supremacy. Finally, the notion that it was an endogenously British (or European) 
creation forms one of the hallmarks of Eurocentrism. So by showing that 
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exogenous factors were at play is not merely incidental or secondary – it is a 
fundamental subversion of Eurocentric explanations of European development. 
 
 We therefore talk about ‘European capitalism’ in the same way most authors 
might talk about European colonialism – a global phenomenon but one that was 
nonetheless enacted by certain groups for the benefit of certain groups over others. 
Nowhere do we refer to ‘European capitalism’ as either a monolith (i.e. absent 
internal variations, many different types of capitalism) or as the normative model or 
benchmark from which to judge all other transitions to and forms of capitalism. 
Indeed, we continually make the exact opposite arguments.  Moreover, to talk 
about the relations between Global North and South without confronting the 
specificity of European rule strikes us as one-sided and susceptible to the 
limitations we identify in Subaltern Studies.  
 
 The failure of our critics to recognise ‘Europe’ and ‘European capitalism’ as 
legitimate objects of anti-Eurocentric criticism also points to a more substantial 
assumption that uneasily mixes the empirical with the normative. In the third line of 
criticism, Duzgun (2016: 13) takes us to task for rendering ‘the non-Western 
world… important only insofar as its “contribution” to the (imagined) origins of 
capitalism’. It is worth clarifying that we do not think this is the only way of 
situating the importance of the non-Western world. But in a book about the origins 
of capitalism, talking about non-Western societies in terms of the origins of 
capitalism is somewhat unavoidable. Duzgun may have been more satisfied had we 
also written about non-Western societies’ contribution to other social relations – 
perhaps conceptions of intimacy, or football, intoxication or kittens, but we 
unfortunately considered these outside the scope of this project (but future 
research agendas, for sure).  
 
 Nonetheless, Duzgun suggests that we create new spatial hierarchies 
without actually saying what these hierarchies are or look like. He says such 
hierarchies are created because we produce ‘deviant’ historical cases but do not 
name what these are (if anything, we explicitly state that we reject the notion of 
‘deviant’ cases –HWCR: 49, 56). All of this, he says, rests on an assumption that 
‘everyone “equally” conditioned or contributed to the origin of capitalism’ (Duzgun 
2016: 13, emphasis original) even though we never make this claim (we, again, 
make the opposite claim – after all: ‘uneven and combined development’). Finally, 
even if we did claim that everyone equally contributed to the origins of capitalism, 
that causal premise (one we do not accept) in no way leads to the normative claim 
that ‘capitalism represents a superior and better mode of organising human 
relations’ – this is yet another claim that we never make in the book.  
89 
 
Why Europe? Anti-Eurocentric Theory, History, and the Rise of Capitalism 
 
 The point is that there is no logical reason why this hypothetical causal 
premise would lead to a normative claim regarding the ostensibly progressive 
character of capitalism. In fact, as Inayatullah and Blaney suggest, we hold a 
decidedly negative view of capitalism; so much so that they criticise us for 
abandoning Marx’s more complex analysis of the gains of capitalism as being ‘real 
relative to past social formations’ though nonetheless ‘limited by the organization of 
capitalism itself’. The point is well taken: of course capitalism led to a ‘process of 
expanded wealth production’ increasing and differentiating new needs while 
producing the ‘material capacities that [potentially] satisfy those needs’ (2016: 41). 
It was for these reasons, among others, that Marx at times23 viewed capitalism as 
serving, as Inayatullah and Blaney (2016: 41) note, a very specific ‘historical 
purpose’: that is, preparing the material conditions and social forces necessary for 
the overthrow of capitalism and transition to communism. However, if we are to 
take the multilinear character of historical development seriously, as we sought to 
do in HWCR, then this historical necessity – and thus the ‘progressive’ nature – of 
capitalism that Marx identified is illusory. That is to say, once we drop the stagist 
assumptions of Marxism, there is no reason to believe that communism required 
the development of capitalism as its necessary pre-condition.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 We would like to reiterate our gratitude to the contributors for encouraging 
us to further reflect upon the tensions and omissions of our analysis. We hope that 
this reply has faithfully confronted these tensions and omissions, resolving some 
and perhaps defending (or encouraging) others. With regards to the tension 
between the ‘being’ (logic) and ‘becoming’ (history) of capitalism, we have argued 
for a historical method that plays on the indeterminacy of this tension. Any attempt 
to fix a centre that defines the being of capitalism, we argue, is constantly 
disturbed by practices at its margins, practices and margins that only become 
visible through an excavation of capitalism’s ‘becoming’. More specifically, we argue 
that histories that start from the Global South disturb the European centre and 
Eurocentric mythologies of the origins of capitalism. 
 
 We showed that such a disturbance led us to a decidedly anti-Eurocentric 
definition of capitalism, one that is inclusive of – rather than silent on – these non-
European histories. Such a definition we showed is distinct from not only 
Eurocentric conceptions based on a singular form of exploitation but also from neo-
Smithian emphases based on exchange and circulation. In this respect, we reaffirm 
the need to avoid the pitfalls of homogeneity present in WSA. In contrast, our 
definition of capitalism avoids a projection of the logic of capitalism transhistorically, 
but it also does not flatten substantive sociological differences between societies.  
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 So long as we remain attentive to such differences, we must also insist on 
the specificity of Europe. This is not to privilege or endow it with exceptional 
internal characteristics. As we have insisted, much of what made Europe distinct or 
peculiar was rooted in interactions and influences that came from beyond its 
borders. Moreover, we argue, it is only through confronting Europe on its own 
ground – by challenging the myths that it was constructed within its own borders – 
that the cage of Eurocentrism can truly be broken and escaped. While affirmations 
of non-European ‘Others’ are of course central to this task, we must not forget to 
also dismantle the European ‘Self’.  
 
 As far as we see it, the conception of capitalism and the question of 
Eurocentrism will likely remain fault lines on which debates around HWCR will – we 
hope – continue to be waged. Whatever the solutions or answers to these issues 
(which in the last instance will only really be decided through practice, through 
struggle, rather than theory) we hope that the terrain or framing of the debate 
remains intersocietal. As we have seen, neither capitalism nor Eurocentrism can be 
confronted by starting from the perspective of one, single society. And insofar as 
our analysis demands a multiplicity of perspectives, we hope for many more voices 
to join the dialogues initiated by the contributors to this symposium. 
 
Notes 
 
1 For further engagements see Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2016a and 2016b. 
2 We would like to also extend our gratitude to the Editor of Spectrum, Faruk Yalvaç, for 
his support and patience. 
3 The dualities Inayatullah and Blaney draw out of our work does much to uncover some of 
the ambiguities and potential tensions in our project – tensions that we, at times, were 
conscious of and sought to directly confront, but tensions that we must admit we weren’t 
aware were as pervasive throughout the whole logic of the book. We must at this stage 
note our gratitude to Inayatullah and Blaney in bringing these dualities out with such clarity 
that it offers the opportunity to clarify and refine our position on these questions.  
4 After all, racists themselves argue that racial hierarchies are present! 
5 This interweaving of being and becoming, logic and history, in defining social forms was 
what in fact distinguished Marx’s method of abstraction. As Bertell Ollman notes (2003: 
116), ‘Things are conceived of, in Marx's words, "as they are and happen”…so that the 
process of their becoming is as much a part of what they are as the qualities associated 
with how they appear and function at this moment’. 
6 One the parallels between Althusserian structuralism and Political Marxism, see Davidson 
(2012: Ch. 18) and Allinson and Anievas (2010a).    
7  Take for example Fanon’s (1963: 40) insight that ‘In the colonies the economic 
substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence’. The type of ‘slightly 
stretched’ Marxism that Fanon calls for in understanding the colonial experience is one we 
try to further develop in understanding the rise of capitalism itself.  
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8 We would argue that the reverse is also true – any attempt to theorise racism today 
without looking at how it relates to the operation of patriarchy or capitalism will be self-
limiting. 
9  Curiously, Mielants claims (2016: 33) that we do not provide ‘any information or 
references’ in HWCR on how patriarchy is constitutive of capitalism and that ‘gendered 
labor relations inherent to the function of a global capitalist economy remain completely 
unexplored’. We would point the reader to our discussion of the subjugation of women in 
the Americas through the ‘culture wars’ waged against the Amerindian populations which, 
as we argued, established a new system of patriarchy that undergirded colonial rule and 
exploitation, and fed into the origins of capitalism (HWCR: 129-134; see also, 325fn92, 
325-26fn101).  
10 We define the forces of production as entailing: (1) the means of production including 
‘nature itself, the capacity to labour, the skills brought to the process, the tools used, and 
the techniques with which these tools are set to work’, and; (2) the labour process, ‘the 
way in which the different means of production are combined in the act of production itself’ 
(Davidson 2012: 128). As such, the forces of production simultaneously capture both 
material and social aspects of production, including for example the ways in which tools 
and technics used in the process of production involve the accumulated collective 
knowledge necessary to deploy them as genuine productive powers (HWCR: 26).  
11  A point of clarification: Polanyi never conceived of ‘institutionalised markets’ as the 
fundamental presupposition or even indicator of the existence of capitalism as his writings 
on the institutionalisation of markets in Ancient Greece – which he did not view as capitalist 
– clearly demonstrates (Polanyi 1977: Part II). Polanyi speaks of the Ancient Greeks as ‘the
initiators of all advanced human economy’, who had ‘almost singlehandedly developed both 
types of economy – the market and exchange type as well as the planning and 
redistributive type — to their highest form reached up till then’ (Polanyi 1977: 146, 274; 
see further, Dale 2016: Ch. 9). In Polanyi’s sense of the term, institutionalised markets 
have existed in many societies and cultures from Ancient Greece and Rome to Sung China 
(960–1279) and early Medieval Europe (see, inter alia, McNeil 1982; Epstein 2000; 
Schoenberger 2008).  
12 We must thank Gareth Dale for discussing Polanyi’s work with us, and for sharing his 
personal notes from the Karl Polanyi Archives from which we have taken some of the 
above quotes.  
13  Unfortunately, Duzgun does not engage with the extensive evidence we provide in 
HWCR in making our case that France can be considered capitalist (see HWCR: 199-213). 
Suffice it to say that if the establishment of a ‘socio-legal order that systematically enables 
and compels producers to transform the labour process according to the dictates of capital 
accumulation’ is, for Duzgun (2016: 12), a hallmark of capitalism, then early post-
revolutionary France was certainly capitalist.  
14 That Duzgun relies on Polanyi’s conception of ‘market society’ compounds this problem 
given that Polanyi held to the subjective marginalist theory of value (Dale 2016). 
15  As Marx puts it (1977: 214): ‘...capital presupposes wage-labour; wage-labour 
presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence of each other: They 
reciprocally bring forth each other’ . 
16  Duzgun (2016: 11-12) also takes issue with our understanding of capital preceding 
capitalism, writing that our ‘transhistorical’ conception of capital leads to both an 
‘everything-ization’ of the pre-conditions of capitalism’s emergence and an 
instrumentalization of ‘the “international”, hence the non-Western world, to fill in a 
preconceived framework of historical change’. But why would pointing to the mere 
presence of wage-labour in pre-modern times lead to an ahistorical conception of 
capitalism if the two (capital and capitalism) are viewed as historically and categorically 
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distinct? Our argument is emphatically not that the presence of the capital-wage-labour 
relation necessarily leads to capitalism. Indeed, we go to some length in making the exact 
opposite case in our analysis of how the ‘antediluvian’ forms of capital in the Renaissance 
Italian city-states proved fleeting and unsustainable (HWCR: 215-222). The point being 
that one cannot teleologically read back in time any kind of ‘capitalism in the waiting’. 
Moreover, unless one is to deny the existence of capital-wage-labour relation in the pre-
modern era, Duzgun’s argument regarding our ostensible instrumentalisation of ‘the 
international’ also makes no sense. Alternatively, if Duzgun’s argument is that the capital 
relation only emerged with the rise of capitalism, then it would be he who is attempting to 
‘fit’ history into a ‘preconceived framework of historical change’ given the vast wealth of 
studies demonstrating the opposite. 
17 We thank Mielants for correcting what was, on our part, an improper use of the label 
‘World Systems Theory’ to classify this body of thought. From here on we use his 
formulation.  
18 Unfortunately, at times Mielants’ confuses our specific critiques of Wallerstein with more 
general critiques of WSA as a whole.  
19 Of course, whether or not the Soviet Union can be considered capitalist for other reasons 
is an entirely different matter.  
20 Wallerstein (1997: 103) in fact insists that if one focuses ‘too much on non-European 
agency as a theme, we end up whitewashing all of Europe’s sins, or at least most of them’.  
21 Mielants claims that WSA is not guilty of this, suggesting WSA demonstrates extensive 
accounts of anti-systemic movements. However, the counter-evidence he provides is 
entirely outside of the 13-18th century timeframe we deploy in the book. It seems then that 
anti-systemic movements only really emerge as an object of study for WSA after capitalism 
has been established. In a typical WSA manoeuvre, capitalism is assumed but not 
explained. It precisely these two features of WSA that we criticise in HWCR. Indeed, our 
critique of Wallerstein’s WSA was not that he – or other WSA scholars – ignore the non-
West in general, but that his (specific) account of the rise of capitalism fails to 
substantively incorporate the ‘periphery’ as an active, constitutive agent in the process of 
capitalist development. In other words, the ‘incorporation’ of non-Western societies into 
the capitalist world-system is conceptualised as a one-way, top-down process rather than a 
co-constitutive one.   
22 To begin with, any explanation that proceeds on the basis of ‘exogenous forces’ is, by 
definition, not methodologically nationalist. Although we do talk about ‘the peculiar 
development of the English state’ it is not clear what is problematic about this – after all, 
no two societies have the same history – given that the claim is rooted in the rejection of 
stadial explanations that we place at the centre of our theoretical framework: recall 
Trotsky’s discussion of the ‘peculiarities of Russian history’.  
23 There is some debate as to whether the ‘late’ Marx continued to hold such a view (see 
Stedman Jones 2008; Anderson 2010).  
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